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A New Preclearance Coverage Formula:  
Renewing the Promise of the Voting Rights Act 
Oluoma Kas-Osoka

 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965
1
 (VRA) sought to break the grip of 
state disenfranchisement experienced by African American voters.
2
 
Congress determined that existing federal laws against discrimination 
were not comprehensive enough to prevent state officials from 
employing illegal practices during elections.
3
 The VRA provided 
targeted reforms to the electoral process on both the national and 
state levels.
4
 For example, Section 4(b) of the VRA outlined a 
coverage formula that targeted certain jurisdictions that had a 
previous history of voting discrimination.
5
 
This Note examines the numerous legal challenges to the VRA 
subsequent to its enactment that have effectively disassembled the 
protections provided by the Act. Along with these challenges, it also 
examines the impact of barriers to voting (specifically voter 
identification laws) and Congress’s attempt to put the pieces of the 
 
 
 B.A., Human Biology (2010), Stanford University; J.D. (2014), Washington 
University School of Law in St. Louis. Sincerest thanks to Professor Greg Magarian for his 
guidance. Thanks for the support and encouragement from family and friends, especially my 
significant other Johnathan Barnes. All errors are my own.  
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006) [hereinafter “VRA”].  
 2. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ 
crt/about/vot/intro/intro_b.php (last visited Feb. 1, 2014) (providing information about 
enforcement the VRA by the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of 
Justice). 
 3. “Congress determined that the existing federal anti-discrimination laws were not 
sufficient to overcome the resistance by state officials to enforcement of [federal laws]. The 
legislative hearings showed that the Department of Justice’s efforts to eliminate discriminatory 
election practices by litigation on a case-by-case basis had been unsuccessful in opening up the 
registration process; as soon as one discriminatory practice or procedure was proven to be 
unconstitutional and enjoined, a new one would be substituted in its place and litigation would 
have to commence anew.” Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See infra note 27. 
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puzzle back together again to secure and ensure the right to vote for 
minority citizens. I argue that the amendment to the VRA, proposed 
on January 16, 2014, does not do enough to protect minority voters, 
and I advocate for a new coverage formula to effectuate the overall 
purpose of the VRA. 
Part I of this Note provides the history behind the significance of 
the VRA and describes the main provisions of the statute that 
intersect with Section 4(b). This section also examines the significant 
constitutional challenges to the VRA, specifically Section 4(b). In 
doing so, it will highlight four decisions handed down by the 
Supreme Court with regard to the scope of the statute’s protections 
for voters and voting rights; this section will focus on the recent 
Supreme Court decision, Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder,
6
 that 
declared Section 4(b) of the VRA unconstitutional. Part III examines 
the modern barriers that prevent voters from fully exercising their 
right to vote, and Congress’s first attempt at reconstructing a 
coverage formula to provide proper protection for vulnerable voters. 
Finally, Part IV of this Note, provides an analysis of the proposed fix 
to the VRA in light of the recent challenges to voters’ rights.  
I. HISTORY 
A. Purpose and Provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
The VRA “codifies and effectuates the Fifteenth Amendment’s 
permanent guarantee that, throughout the nation, no person shall be 
denied the right to vote on account of race or color.”
7
 According to 
the Department of Justice, the Act is generally considered the most 
successful piece of civil rights legislation passed by Congress.
8
 The 
VRA consists of a comprehensive set of complex, interlocking 
mechanisms designed to protect the vote of African-Americans
9
 who 
 
 6. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 7. Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/intro/intro.php (last visited Feb. 1, 2014). 
 8. Id. 
 9. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT & 
REAUTHORIZATION: THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S RECORD OF ENFORCING THE TEMPORARY 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT PROVISIONS 1 (2006). 
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have historically been disenfranchised. The passage of the VRA was 
a hard fought victory to secure the right to vote and the right to 
equality under the Constitution.
10
 In order to ensure that this victory 
against disenfranchisement remained in place and effective, Congress 
incorporated various provisions within the statute to apply to certain 
jurisdictions.
11
 
Initially, the primary focus of the VRA was to ensure that African 
Americans could register and vote in Southern states where 
substantial disenfranchisement occurred.
12
 As a result of formal and 
informal mechanisms of disenfranchisement, “black voter registration 
and turnout were virtually eliminated by the early twentieth 
century.”
13
 In order to diminish vote denial
14
 and vote dilution,
15
 the 
VRA contained multiple permanent nationwide provisions and 
several temporary provisions that only applied to certain covered 
 
 10. STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT, THE LAW IS GOOD: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 
REDISTRICTING, AND BLACK REGIME POLITICS 53 (2010). 
 11. “Congress clearly intended the VRA to close whatever loopholes in the Civil War 
amendments that southern voter registrars and other officials had used to perpetuate black 
disenfranchisement. Toward that end, the VRA spelled out a number of legally and politically 
innovative, as well as controversial and contestable, mechanisms to bring federal power to bear 
on state and local officials.” Id.  
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Vote denial occurs when certain “election standards, practices, procedures, and forms 
of government that have the purpose or effect of preventing a person of color from casting a 
vote.” Id. at 54.  
 15. Additional protections were necessary to shield voters from electoral system practices 
that diminished the relative weight of minority votes. After the law was adopted, African 
Americans began to elect their own candidates for office. Because they could no longer pass 
laws or intimidate black voters at the ballot box, some southern communities introduced 
policies designed to dilute minority voting strength. Many cities changed their elections from 
separate multimember districts to at-large elections. Though the laws did not prohibit or prevent 
blacks from voting, they significantly diminished the chances that a single black candidate 
would win the election. COLIN D. MOORE, EXTENSIONS OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, THE 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT: SECURING THE BALLOT 98 (Richard M. Valelley ed., 2006). When 
African Americans attempted to run for elected positions, discriminatory administration of 
neutral laws resulted in “abolition of office, extension of the term of the white incumbent; 
substitution of appointment for election; increase in filing fees; raising of requirements for 
independent candidates; increase in property qualifications; withholding nominating petitions.” 
GERALD ROSENBURG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 81 
(1993). 
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jurisdictions.
16
 These temporary provisions were reauthorized most 
recently in 2006 and are currently set to expire in 2031.
17
 
Section 2,
18
 a permanent provision of the VRA, is the main legal 
enforcement mechanism for the law. This provision provides a 
permanent nationwide ban on voter prerequisites that would stifle the 
right to vote based on race, color, or, as of the 1982 amendment, 
“language minority” status.
19
 Section 2 also allows a large class of 
potential litigants to bring suit against jurisdictions who have 
allegedly violated voter’s civil rights.
20
 This encourages jurisdictions 
 
 16. LIGHT, supra note 10, at 54. These temporary provisions are periodically reauthorized 
by Congress as per statute.  
 17. Voting Rights Act, THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, http://www.civilrights.org/voting-
rights/vra/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2014) (“Congress has reauthorized the VRA four times, most 
recently in 2006, when both the House and the Senate approved the measure overwhelmingly in 
a bipartisan manner. Congress conducted more than twenty hearings, heard from more than 90 
expert witnesses, and collected more than 15,000 pages of testimony documenting the 
continuing need for and constitutionality of the statute.”). See also infra note 74. 
 18. Section 2 provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure 
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the 
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color . . .  
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006). A political subdivision is defined as “as any county or parish, 
except that where registration for voting is not conducted under the supervision of a county or 
parish, the term shall include any other subdivision of a State which conducts registration for 
voting.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(2) (2006). 
 19. See infra note 25. The 1982 amendment to Section 2 provided protection against 
denial of voting rights based on “language minority” status. The language minority provisions 
are contained in Sections 203 and Section 4(f)(4) of the VRA. Sections 203 and 4(f)(4) require 
that when a covered state of political subdivision “provides any registration or voting notices, 
forms, instructions, assistance, or other materials of information relating to the electoral 
process, including ballots, it shall provide them in the language of the applicable minority group 
as well as in the English language.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (f)(4) (2006). See also About Language 
Minority Voting Rights, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/ 
sec_203/activ_203.php (last visited Feb. 7, 2014) (“The requirements of the law are 
straightforward: all election information that is available in English must also be available in 
the minority language so that all citizens will an effective opportunity to register, learn the 
details of the elections, and cast a free and effective ballot.”).  
 20. LIGHT, supra note 10, at 55. Section 2, as amended in 1982, grants the Attorney 
General and private individuals who are aggrieved (or similarly situated to those aggrieved) the 
right to challenge in federal court any voting practice or standard that has a racially 
discriminatory intent or effect. Id. For litigants, it is now no longer required to prove to a 
reviewing court that a jurisdiction intended to discriminate. Id. Instead, a discriminatory effect 
on the ability of minority voters to elect their candidates of choice would be sufficient to 
demonstrate a violation of Section 2. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/13
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nationwide to promote preemptive mechanisms to avoid vote dilution 
litigation.
21
 These optional measures developed and adopted by local 
districts include switching to a “single-member district-based system 
and creat[ing] districts in which voters of color constitute a 
substantial enough majority to overcome racially polarized voting 
patterns.”
22
 
Section 5,
23
 a temporary provision of the VRA that must be 
reauthorized by Congress, is the statute’s key administrative 
enforcement mechanism. Only certain jurisdictions, as outlined in 
Section 4, are subject to this preclearance provision.
24
 In order to 
avoid case-by-case litigation, the provision halted all changes to 
voting procedures or practices that are not approved through federal 
authorization.
25
 Federal authorization is provided by the Attorney 
General or a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for 
 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. 
 23. Section 5 of the VRA states: 
Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set 
forth in section 4(a) are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting 
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect 
to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964, such State or 
subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, 
practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, and unless and until 
the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to 
comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. [The] 
procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if [it] has been submitted by the 
chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the 
Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within 
sixty days after such submission […] Any action under this section shall be heard and 
determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 
2284 of title 28 of the United States Code and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme 
Court. 
42 U.S.C § 1973c(a) (2006). 
 24. See infra note 27. 
 25. Congress reauthorized Section 5 in 1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006. The reauthorization 
in 1975 expanded Section 5 coverage to include “language minority citizens” with limited 
command of the English language, including Hispanic Americans, American Indians, Asian 
Americans, and Alaskan Natives. The 2006 reauthorization extended the provision for the next 
twenty-five years. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 2. 
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the District of Columbia.
26
 After the jurisdiction obtains proper 
authorization of the proposed change, its political officials may 
implement the proposal.
27
 
Section 4
28
 contained a triggering formula that determined which 
jurisdictions were subject to preclearance under Section 5. Section 
4(b) established the coverage formula that subjected certain states to 
review by the Department of Justice. Another targeted solution 
 
 26. Judicial Review of Voting Changes, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ 
crt/about/vot/sec_5/about.php (last visited Dec. 24, 2014). Additionally, the Attorney General 
could assign a federal examiner to a covered jurisdiction to review the qualifications of 
potential voters. About Federal Observers and Election Monitoring, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/examine/activ_exam.php#observers (last visited Dec. 24, 
2014). Moreover, in these counties where a federal examiner was assigned, the Attorney 
General could request monitoring of polling place activities by federal observers. Id. 
 27. LIGHT, supra note 10, at 57. “Preclearance” refers to the permission to implement a 
covered jurisdiction’s proposed change after federal review and approval. After an 
administrative or judicial finding that the change proposed by the covered jurisdiction has 
“neither the purpose nor effect of denying or abridging the right to vote as a result of race, 
color, or language minority status, nor does it worsen the existing status of minority voters’ 
ability to elect their own candidates of choice in relation to white voters,” the jurisdiction can 
proceed to institute the proposal. Id. The change becomes legally enforceable by the covered 
jurisdiction. Id. 
 28. Section 4 provides in pertinent part: 
(a) [N]o citizen shall be denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election 
because of his failure to comply with any test or device in any State with respect to 
which the determinations have been made under subsection (b) or in any political 
subdivision with respect to which such determinations have been made as a separate 
unit, unless the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in an action 
for a declaratory judgment brought by such State or subdivision against the United 
States has determined that no such test or device has been used during the five years 
preceding the filing of the action for the purpose or with the effect of denying or 
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. 
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall apply in any State or in any political 
subdivision of a state which (1) the Attorney General determines maintained on 
November 1, 1964, any test or device, and with respect to which (2) the Director of the 
Census determines that less than 50 percentum of the persons of voting age residing 
therein were registered on November 1, 1964, or that less than 50 percentum of such 
persons voted in the presidential election of November 1964. 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1) (2006)). Before the coverage formula was repealed by a recent Supreme 
Court decision, Section 4 covered nine states (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia) in their entirety, and parts of six others 
(California, Florida, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, South Dakota). See infra note 30. 
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prohibited use of any “test or device,”
29
 to deny the right to vote. 
This provision also provided the Attorney General with the authority 
to appoint federal observers and examiners to certain specified 
jurisdictions to ensure compliance with federal law.
30
  
To trigger the coverage formula under Section 4 of the VRA, two 
elements must be satisfied. The first requirement is satisfied if on 
November 1, 1964, the state or political subdivision of the state 
maintained a test or device restricting the opportunity for citizens to 
vote.
31
 The second requirement to establish preclearance is met if the 
Director of the Census Bureau determined that less than 50 percent of 
persons of voting age were registered to vote on November 1, 1964, 
or that less than 50 percent of persons of voting age voted in the 
presidential election of November 1964.
32
 
Section 4 also provides a mechanism for states to terminate 
coverage under the preclearance provisions.
33
 This process, known as 
the “bailout” provision, was originally enacted in 1965 as pathway to 
remedy any possible overreaching resulting from the application of 
 
 29. “Test or device” is defined in Section 4(c) of the VRA to refer to: “any requirement 
that person as a perquisite for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrates the ability to 
read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrates any educational achievement 
of his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his 
qualification by the voucher of registered voters or members of any other class.” Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973b(c) (2006)).  
 Examples of these devices include literacy tests and poll taxes. See infra note 43; Rebecca 
Onion, Take the Impossible “Literacy” Test Louisiana Gave Black Voters in the 1960s, SLATE 
(June 28, 2013), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_vault/2013/06/28/voting_rights_and_the_ 
supreme_court_the_impossible_literacy_test_louisiana.html.  
 30. According to the Department of Justice, the examiners would prepare and forward 
lists of people who had the qualifications to vote in these jurisdictions. The federal observers 
were provided to the jurisdictions that were certified by the Attorney General for these federal 
examiners. Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ 
crt/about/vot/misc/sec_4.php (last visited Feb. 6, 2014). 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2006). 
 32. Id. This resulted in these entire states becoming covered jurisdictions: Alabama, 
Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia. Smaller political 
subdivisions were covered in Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, and North Carolina. In fully covered 
states, the state as whole (including any political subdivisions of the state) is subject to the 
preclearance requirement. In states only partially covered, the special provisions only apply to 
the identified counties. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 30. 
 33. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1) (2006). See infra note 35. 
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the preclearance formula.
34
 A jurisdiction attempting to “bailout” 
must seek a declaratory judgment from a three-judge panel in the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
35
 The 
Attorney General may also consent to an entry of judgment granting 
the bailout petition prior to filing with the three-judge panel of the 
District of Columbia court.
36
 Before the jurisdiction will obtain a 
consent decree from the Attorney General accepting any provisional 
bailout procedures, it must (1) eliminate voting procedures that 
restrict access to the electoral process; (2) demonstrate constructive 
effort to eliminate harassment and intimidation of persons seeking to 
register to vote; (3) expand opportunities for voter participation; and 
(4) present evidence of minority electoral participation.
37
   
 
 34. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 30 (“Terminating coverage under the act’s special 
provisions”). 
 35. In Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder, the Court held 
that any jurisdiction currently subject to the Section 5 preclearance requirement may obtain 
“bailout” from coverage by the three-judge panel if during the past ten years and while the 
action is pending:  
(a) no test or device has been used within the jurisdiction for the purpose or with the 
effect of voting discrimination;  
(b) all changes affecting voting have been reviewed under Section 5 prior to their 
implementation; 
(c) no change affecting voting has been the subject of an objection by the Attorney 
General or the denial of a Section 5 declaratory judgment from the District of 
Columbia district court; 
(d) there have been no adverse judgments in lawsuits alleging voting discrimination; 
(e) there have been no consent decrees or agreements that resulted in the abandonment 
of a discriminatory voting practice; 
(f) there are no pending lawsuits that allege voting discrimination and federal 
examiners have not been assigned 
(g) there have been no violations of the Constitution or federal, state, or local laws 
with respect to voting discrimination unless the jurisdiction establishes that such 
violations were trivial, were promptly corrected, and were not repeated. 
557 U.S. at 199; see also supra note 30 (“Terminating coverage under the act’s special 
provisions”). 
 36. See supra note 30. 
 37. Id. These requirements apply to “all governmental units within the geographical 
boundaries of the jurisdiction.” Id. Therefore, the criteria for bailout of the state must be 
established for every school district, town, city, or county within its boundaries. Id.  
 Any jurisdiction seeking “bailout” must inform the public, and any aggrieved party has the 
ability to intervene in the litigation. Id. After the court grants relief from preclearance, there is a 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/13
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B. Section 4 in the Courts  
When the VRA was enacted in 1965, the Supreme Court 
immediately faced direct challenges to its constitutionality. In South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach,
38
 the Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the VRA in its entirety.
39
 The text of the coverage formula was 
defined in Section 4(b) of the Act. The Court explained that Congress 
used “reliable evidence of actual voting discrimination”
40
 to 
determine the States and subdivisions that would be most affected by 
the remedies in the provision.
41
  
The Court discussed how Congress determined which geographic 
areas had substantial evidence of voting discrimination in order to 
delineate the boundary between covered and uncovered 
jurisdictions.
42
 By utilizing evidence of voting impropriety from the 
Department of Justice and the Civil Rights Commission, two 
characteristics were found that were later incorporated into the 
formula: “the use of tests and devices for voter registration, and a 
voting rate in the 1964 presidential election at least 12 points below 
the national average.”
43
 The Court determined that the coverage 
 
ten year “recapture” period. Id. For the duration of this period, the district court could reopen 
proceedings should the jurisdiction engage in any prohibited conduct. Id. The district court will 
review the evidence and determine whether to reinstate coverage. Id.  
 38. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
 39. Id. at 337. 
 40. Id. at 329. 
 41. Id. Under the enumerated powers of the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress has the 
ability to remedy the problem of voting discrimination. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345–
46. (“Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects of the [Civil 
War] amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they 
contain and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the 
equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within 
the domain of congressional power.”).  
 42. 383 U.S. at 329. 
 43. Id. at 330. The Court outlined why these devices were important to the continued 
execution of the “evil” of voting discrimination: “Tests and devices are relevant to voting 
discrimination because of their long history as a tool of perpetrating the evil; a low voting rate 
is pertinent for the obvious reason that widespread disenfranchisement must inevitably affect 
the number of actual voters.” Id.  
 There were various configurations of tests and devices utilized by the legislatures in 
Southern states. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND BLACK 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: SECURING THE BALLOT, supra note 15, at 
37–38. Disenfranchisement of African American voters took the form of complicated 
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formula was a permissible use of Congress’ power because it was 
specific to and encompassed only those localities where egregious 
violations of voters’ rights occurred.
44
 
In City of Rome v. United States, the Court reaffirmed the use of 
the coverage formula.
45
 The case arose when Rome, Georgia, was 
denied “bailout” under Section 4. The Court concluded that the entire 
state of Georgia must satisfy the requirements of Section 4 before the 
city could be removed from the preclearance requirement.
46
 After 
recognizing the serious federalism implications of the VRA,
47
 the 
Court allowed Congress’s intrusion on the condition that the 
preclearance requirement was imposed only in response to some 
perceived harm.
48
 It found this condition satisfied, in that the 
coverage formula placed only the jurisdictions with the most grievous 
track record of disenfranchisement of voters
49
 under Department of 
Justice supervision. 
The Court reaffirmed the use of the coverage formula’s remedial 
mechanism in Lopez v. Monterey County, California.
50
 Five Hispanic 
voters sued Monterey County alleging violation of Section 5 by 
 
registration requirements that allowed voting registrars, who were predominantly white, broad 
discretion. Id. These requirements also “disadvantaged illiterate[ ]” voters who were presumed 
to be predominantly black. Id. Secret-ballot laws forced voters to read and mark election ballots 
themselves, essentially functioning as literacy tests. Id. 
 Literacy tests were overwhelmingly adopted by most Southern states. These tests 
“disproportionately disqualified blacks even if applied fairly because of blacks’ higher rates of 
illiteracy. But no one expected registrars appointed by white supremacist Democrats to 
impartially administer the tests.” Id. Also, most of the tests included “understanding clauses” 
that allowed registrars to “enroll (white) illiterates who could understand a constitutional 
provision read to them.” Id. Grandfather clauses exempted people who were eligible to vote 
before 1867 and their descendants from literacy tests. Id. Moreover, poll taxes employed by 
every Southern state disparately affected poor African Americans. Id. The Democratic all-white 
primaries excluded African Americans from the only significant Southern elections after 1890. 
Id. 
 44. 383 U.S. at 331. 
 45. 446 U.S. 156 (1980). 
 46. Id. at 200–01. 
 47. Id. at 201. Federalism becomes a concern when discussing disparate treatment of the 
states. Under the Constitution, each state is an equal sovereign that should be treated the same 
by the federal government. Therefore, a law treating one state differently than another will be 
strictly scrutinized to ensure it is narrowly tailored to meet its goal. 
 48. Id. at 202. 
 49. Id.  
 50. 525 U.S. 266 (1999). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/13
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015]  Renewing the Promise of the Voting Rights Act 161 
 
 
failing to obtain federal preclearance before consolidation of the 
judicial district. The Court recognized that the VRA’s purpose was to 
subject continuous violators of voting rights to federal scrutiny and 
shift the burden of proof of proper behavior to the state legislature, 
otherwise known as the “perpetrators of the evil.”
51
 The Court found 
the bailout provision significant
52
 because it limited the extent of the 
Department of Justice’s control over the affairs of the states that had 
successfully complied with the preclearance requirement.
53
 The 
Court determined that in order to remedy the consequences of 
intentional racial discrimination, Congress must properly define the 
wrongs committed.
54
 
C. Coverage Formula Repealed 
The most recent Supreme Court decision concerning the VRA 
involved a challenge in 2013 to the statute’s constitutionality arising 
in Shelby County, Alabama, a covered jurisdiction. Instead of 
seeking bailout to implement proposed voting changes, the county 
sued the Attorney General in the District Court of the District of 
Columbia “seeking a declaratory judgment that sections 4(b) and 5 
are facially unconstitutional.”
55
 The county also sought a permanent 
injunction against the enforcement of these provisions.
56
 The district 
court, ruling against the county, found that the “evidence before 
Congress in 2006 was sufficient to justify reauthorizing [Section] 5 
and continuing the [Section] 4(b) coverage formula.”
57
 
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the decision of 
the district court.
58
 The court analyzed the constitutionality of Section 
4(b) by assessing evidence of successful Section 2 litigation with the 
 
 51. Id. at 291. 
 52. Id. at 284. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 294–95 (“Essential to our holdings in Katzenbach and City of Rome was our 
conclusion that Congress was remedying the effects of prior intentional racial discrimination. In 
both cases, we required Congress to have some evidence that the jurisdiction burdened with 
preclearance obligations had actually engaged in such intentional discrimination.”). 
 55. Shelby Cnty v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2621–22 (2013). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 2622. 
 58. Shelby Cnty, Alabama v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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effect of Section 5. The court concluded that the statute continued “to 
single out jurisdictions in which discrimination is concentrated.”
59
 
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the 
coverage formula was constitutional.
60
 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and instead of the 
deferential treatment toward the findings developed by Congress in 
relation to the bill, the majority, led by Chief Justice John Roberts, 
disparaged the continued reliance on the existing formula to 
determine the covered jurisdictions subject to the preclearance 
requirement. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
61
 and did not 
show deference toward the original Congressional findings. Instead, 
the majority, led by Chief Justice John Roberts, disparaged the 
continued reliance on the existing formula to determine the covered 
jurisdictions subject to the preclearance requirement.
62
 The Court 
held that in light of the disparate treatment of certain states under 
Section 5 and the improving conditions for minority voting and 
voters in the South, the burdens that the Act imposes were not 
justified by the current needs.
63 
The majority insisted that the South 
had changed measurably because voter turnout and registration rates 
approach parity today. As such, they argued that blatant 
discriminatory violation of federal law is highly unlikely, and used 
the fact that minority candidates hold more political offices today 
than ever before to buttress their position.
64
 In order to ground 
Section 4(b)’s coverage formula in current conditions, the Court 
 
 59. Id. at 883. 
 60. Id. at 884. 
 61. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612.  
 62. Chief Justice Roberts stated, “Regardless of how to look at the record, however, no 
one can fairly say that it shows anything approaching the ‘pervasive,’ ‘flagrant,’ ‘widespread,’ 
and ‘rampant’ discrimination that faced Congress in 1965, and that clearly distinguished the 
covered jurisdictions from the rest of the Nation at that time.” Id. at 2629 (citing Katzenbach, 
383 U.S. at 308, 315, 331; Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 
193, 201, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009). The majority was concerned that a more fundamental 
problem still remained: “Congress did not use the record it compiled to shape a coverage 
formula grounded in current conditions. It instead reenacted a formula based on 40-year-old 
facts having no logical relation to the present day.” Id.  
 63. Id. at 2622 (“Departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a 
showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that 
it targets.”) (quoting Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 203). 
 64. Id. at 2631 (citing Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 203). 
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reasoned that current statistics updated with information from the last 
forty years must be used to establish which jurisdictions could be 
added or removed from the statute.
65
 
In a forceful dissent, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by 
Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, argued that though the 
country has made gains in the fight against discrimination, Congress 
determined in 2006 that the preclearance formula remains justifiable 
today.
66
 The dissent explained that terminating the preclearance 
formula would be a disservice to the struggle for voter protection.
67
   
The dissent focused on the success of the coverage formula in 
eliminating barriers to voting and argued that these barriers could 
quickly resurface if the preclearance remedy is eliminated.
68
 This 
argument is supported by the fact that covered jurisdictions subject to 
the preclearance requirement continue to submit changes to voting 
laws that are subsequently declined by the Attorney General.
69
 The 
dissent explained that because minority voting numbers have 
increased, dilution of minority voting strength is an ever-present 
threat.
70
 These efforts to reduce the impact of minority votes are 
described as “second-generation” barriers to minority voting.
71
 These 
 
 65. “There is no valid reason to insulate the coverage formula from review merely 
because it was previously enacted 40 years ago. If Congress had started from scratch in 2006, it 
plainly would not have enacted the present coverage formula. It would have been irrational for 
Congress to distinguish between States in such a fundamental way based on 40 year old data, 
when today’s statistics tell an entirely different story.” Id. at 2630–31.  
 66. 133 S. Ct. at 2632. According to the dissent, Congress’s overwhelming findings in the 
record supported the conclusion that preclearance provisions should continue in force. Id. 
(“Recognizing that large progress has been made, Congress determined, based on a voluminous 
record, that the scourge of discrimination was not yet extirpated.”). 
 67. Id. at 2633 (“[T]he Court today terminates the remedy that proved to be best suited to 
block [voting] discrimination. The [VRA] has worked to combat voting discrimination where 
other remedies had been tried and failed. Particularly effective is the VRA’s requirement of 
federal preclearance for all changes to voting law in the regions of the country with the most 
aggravated records of rank discrimination against minority voting rights.”). 
 68. Id. at 2634 (“[T]he Act, to date, surely has not eliminated all vestiges of 
discrimination against the exercise of the franchise by minority citizens.”)  
 69. Id. 
 70. “It soon became apparent that guaranteeing equal access to the polls would not suffice 
to root out the other racially discriminatory practices such as voting dilution.” Id. at 2634. 
Justice Ginsburg explained that when voting dilution is adopted with a discriminatory purpose, 
this severs the right to vote as exactly as the denial of access to the ballot box. Id.  
 71. Id. at 2635. Voter dilution is the most serious problem, as second generation 
discriminatory practices intended to marginalize minority voters are no longer as blatant. Id.  
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“second-generation” barriers include, but are not limited to voter 
identification laws,
72
 at-large voting in cities with a sizable black 
minority,
73
 and discriminatory annexation.
74
  
Justice Ginsburg also described Congress’s enormous task to 
reauthorize the VRA’s temporary provisions in 2006.
75
 The record 
compiled by Congress revealed evidence of continued discrimination, 
which lead Congress to conclude that oversight by the federal 
government was still needed to protect vulnerable populations of 
minority voters.
76
 The dissent objected to the majority’s lack of 
deference to Congress’s judgment in exercising its power to enforce 
the constitutional guarantees of equal protection under the law and 
equal access to the ballot.
77
 This evidence compiled by Congress, the 
dissent explained, supported “its decision to reauthorize the coverage 
formula in [section] 4(b).”
78
 A study conducted by Ellen Katz,
79
 in 
 
 72. See infra notes 83, 84.  
 73. At-large voting (as opposed to a system of district-by-district voting) in a city with a 
large amount of minorities would dilute minority votes because the overall majority would 
control the election of each member of the city council, effectively eliminating the potency of 
concentrated minority votes. Id. In an at-large election system, voters throughout an entire 
political jurisdiction can vote for all seats up for election. In this system, only a small majority 
of the voters can control 100 percent of the seats. LIGHT, supra note 10, at 55 (“Assuming 
whites are in the majority, and racial bloc voting exists—in which white voters usually vote as a 
bloc to defeat candidates of color—black votes in an at-large system continually will be 
submerged by white votes.”). 
 74. 133 S. Ct. at 2635. Annexations have the potential to seriously impact voting in two 
ways. First, annexations change boundary lines of a city, enlarging the number of eligible voters 
inside the city and leaving other voters outside. These annexations can lead to inclusion of 
whites or exclusion of minorities from voting. Second, annexations dilute the weight of the 
votes of individuals who lived within boundaries of the city prior to the annexation. 
Consequently, if the property annexed has a sizeable white population, the annexation will 
result in a dilution of minority votes. Amanda K. Baumle, Mark Fossett & Warren Waren, 
Strategic Annexation Under the Voting Rights Act: Racial Dimensions of Annexation Practices, 
24 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 82 (2008).  
 75. 133 S. Ct. at 2635. The reauthorization process started in October 2005 and continued 
until July 2006. Id. The House and the Senate held extensive hearings to consider various 
amendments to the VRA. Id. The reauthorization was passed in the House by a vote of 390 yeas 
to 33 nays. Id. The bill was subsequently read and debated in the Senate where it passed by a 
vote of 98 to 0. Id. President Bush signed the bill a week after it was passed, “recognizing the 
need for ‘further work . . . in the fight against injustice,’ and calling the reauthorization ‘an 
example of our continued commitment to a united America where every person is valued and 
treated with dignity and respect.’” Id. (citations omitted). 
 76. Id. at 2636. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 2642.  
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particular, helped Congress learn of the continuing need for 
preclearance coverage for jurisdictions previously subject to the 
requirement.
80
 The study analyzed the judicial decisions under 
Section 2 of the VRA and showed that though covered jurisdictions 
account for less than one-quarter of the nation’s population, they 
account for 56 percent of successful Section 2 litigation.
81
 The dissent 
urged that in order for the VRA to continue to be effective, Section 4 
protections must remain in place.
82
 
II. UPDATING THE PRECLEARANCE COVERAGE FORMULA 
A. Aftermath of Shelby County  
After the Court struck down Section 4(b) of the VRA in Shelby 
County, various states that previously constituted covered 
jurisdictions under Section 4 attempted to immediately implement 
radical changes to their voting laws. Policy changes, such as voter 
identification laws, movement and fluctuation in the number of 
polling places, and reduction in the number of days or hours people 
can vote, represent new second generation barriers to voting that 
threaten to diminish the power of minority voters.
83
  
 
 79. Ellen Katz, Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 
2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643 (2005). This report 
examined the Section 2 suits between 1982 and 2004. Justice Ginsburg explained Congress’s 
approach to the study was to compare the Section 2 lawsuits in covered and uncovered 
jurisdictions to provide an “appropriate yardstick for measuring differences between” the two 
types of jurisdictions. 133 S. Ct. at 2642. The rate of successful Section 2 lawsuits should be the 
same in both covered and uncovered jurisdictions if the difference in the risk of voting 
discrimination had disappeared. However, the Katz study found that racial discrimination still 
remained concentrated in the jurisdictions subject to the preclearance requirement. Id. 
 80. 133 S. Ct. at 2643. “Because preclearance occurs only in covered jurisdictions and can 
be expected to stop the most obviously objectionable measures, one would expect a lower rate 
of successful [section] 2 lawsuits in those jurisdictions if the risk of voting discrimination there 
were the same as elsewhere in the country.” Id. at 2643 n.6. 
 81. Spencer Overton, Shelby County v. Holder: Voting discrimination remains 
concentrated in covered states, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2013/02/shelby-county-v-holder-voting-discrimination-remains-concentrated-in-covered-states/ 
 82. 133 S. Ct. at 2651. 
 83. Michael Cooper, After Ruling, States Rush to Enact Voting Laws, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/06/us/politics/after-Supreme-Court-ruling-states-rush-
to-enact-voting-laws.html. 
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Within twenty-four hours after the decision was handed down by 
the Court, five of the nine covered states moved forward with voter 
identification laws.
84
 Less than two hours after the decision, Texas’s 
voter identification law immediately took effect.
85
 Considered the 
most restrictive in the country, the Texas voter identification law 
requires proof of citizenship and residency in the state in order to cast 
a ballot.
86
 To qualify to vote, a citizen has the option of presenting 
one of the seven forms of identification outlined in the statute.
87
 
Voters who are unable to provide proper identification cast 
provisional ballots and must return to the polling place within six 
days of the date of the election to provide photo identification.
88
 
Supporters of voter identification laws state that the laws are 
needed to combat potential voter fraud.
89
 Opponents of the law 
contend that voter fraud is extremely rare, and the laws, passed 
primarily by predominantly Republican state legislatures, were 
intended to suppress the Democratic turnout, since those most likely 
to be without state-approved photo identification are members of 
 
 84. Sarah Childress, With Voting Rights Act Out, States Push Voter ID Laws, PBS 
FRONTLINE (June 26, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/government-elections-
politics/with-voting-rights-act-out-states-push-voter-id-laws/. The states that were previously 
subject to section 4(b) preclearance requirements include Texas, South Carolina, Alabama, 
Virginia, and Mississippi. Id. 
 85. Statement by Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott, TEX. ATT’Y GEN. (June 25, 2013), 
https://www.oag.state.tx.us/oagnews/release.php?id=4435. Before the Shelby County decision, 
the three-judge panel in the District Court for the District of Columbia unanimously agreed to 
block the law in August of 2012. The court ruled that Texas had “failed to show that the statute 
would not harm the voting rights of minorities in the state” and that the “cost of obtaining a 
photo ID would fall most heavily on African American and Hispanic voters.” The panel 
determined that “among residents who lack other forms of acceptable identification, the burden 
of obtaining a state voter [identification] certificate would weigh disproportionately on 
minorities living in poverty, with many having to travel as much as 200 to 250 miles round 
trip.” Sari Horowitz, Texas voter-ID law is blocked, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2012), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/texas-voter-id-law-struck-down/2012/08/30/4a07e 
270-f2ad-11e1-adc6-87dfa8eff430_story.html.  
 86. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 63.0101 (West 2011). 
 87. Id. 
 88. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 65.0541 (West 2011). This is inconvenient and burdensome 
for voters who have already taken time off of work to come to their polling place to vote and 
may not realistically have time to return there within six the proper form of identification. 
 89. Rick Lyman, Pennsylvania Voter ID Law Struck Down as Judge Cites Burden on 
Citizens, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2014), www.nytimes.com/2014/01/18/us/politics/pennsylvania-
voter-id-law-struck-down.html?_r=0. 
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groups that traditionally vote Democratic.
90
 These forms of ID are 
often expensive and difficult to obtain for low-income Americans.
91
  
Research from University of Massachusetts at Boston sociologist 
Keith Bentele and political scientist Erin O’Brien
92
 “shows that 
tougher voter ID laws continue to crop up in GOP-led states where 
minority and lower-income voter turnout has increased.”
93
 The new 
study asserts that the stricter laws associated with photo 
identification, proof of citizenship requirements, registration 
restrictions, absentee ballot voting restrictions, and reductions in 
early voting are “part of a GOP strategy aimed at keeping minority 
and low-income voters away from the polls, despite the fact that 
widespread voter impersonation is virtually nonexistent.”
94
 These are 
“uncomfortable truth[s] with potentially uncomfortable consequences 
that should rattle anyone who cares about voting participation and 
fairness.”
95
 
B. Congressional Response 
On January 16, 2014, three members of the House of 
Representatives proposed the first bipartisan legislation to attempt to 
update the coverage formula repealed by the Supreme Court.
96
 The 
Sesenbrenner-Conyers-Leahy Bill,
97
 or the “Voting Rights 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Childress, supra note 84 (“It requires a passport—the cheapest of which is $55—or a 
copy of your birth certificate, which not all Americans, particularly older ones, have.”). 
 92. See Keith Bentele & Erin O’Brien, States with higher black turnout are more likely to 
restrict voting, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2013, 2:59 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2013/12/17/states-with-higher-black-turnout-are-more-likely-to-restrict-
voting/ (“Ultimately, recently enacted restrictions on voter access have not only a predictable 
partisan pattern but also an uncomfortable relationship to the political activism of blacks and 
the poor.”). 
 93. Voter ID study confirms what we already feared, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Jan. 3, 
2014), http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/20140102-editorial-voter-id-laws-remain-
troublesome.ece. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id.  
 96. This discussion focuses solely on the provisions of the proposed amendment that 
update Section 4, the preclearance coverage formula. This note does not focus on the other 
updates to Section 3 and Section 5 provided in the proposed bill. 
 97. Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014, H.R. 3899, 113th Cong. (2014).  
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Amendment Act of 2014,” provides a new pathway to determine 
which jurisdictions are subject to the preclearance requirements of 
the VRA. 
First, in Section 4(b)(1), the bill separates the application of the 
coverage formula into statewide requirements for coverage and 
political subdivision requirements for coverage.
98
 A state will 
become a covered jurisdiction if during the previous fifteen years 
there were five or more voting rights violations, where at least one 
violation was committed by the state itself.
99
 The preclearance 
requirement will apply to a political subdivision if either (1) three or 
more violations occurred in the subdivision in the last fifteen years; 
or (2) at least one violation occurred in that time frame coupled with 
“persistent, extremely low”
100
 minority voting turnout. If Section 
4(1) applies, the coverage formula would be in effect for that 
jurisdiction for a period of ten years.
101
 
The bill also outlined the effects of declaratory judgment relief 
provided by the courts.
102
 If the state or political subdivision obtains 
a valid and final judgment through this mechanism, the preclearance 
requirement will no longer apply.
103
 This provides another form of 
the bailout provisions provided in the current form of the VRA. 
However, coverage will still apply to the jurisdiction if a voting rights 
violation occurs after the declaratory judgment is issued.
104
 
The proposed amendment also provides guidelines to determine 
whether a “voting rights violation” occurred.
105
 A “voting rights 
violation” occurs when in a final judgment which has not been 
reversed on appeal, any court of the United States determines a denial 
or abridgement of any right of any citizen to vote occurred. A 
violation also occurs when declaratory judgment relief is denied 
 
 98. Id. § 3. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. “Persistent, extremely low minority turnout” is defined in section 4(4) of the 
proposed bill. Section 4(4) outlines criteria to determine the applicability the preclearance 
requirement for both the general and federal elections. Id. § 4(4).  
 101. Id. § 4(2)(A).  
 102. Id. § 4(2)(B).  
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. § 4(3).  
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under the preclearance requirement by the District Court of the 
District of Columbia or the Attorney General successfully objects to 
the declaratory judgment proceeding.  
This provision also provides that the fourth potential “voting 
rights violation,” the Attorney General’s interposed objection, must 
not be based on a voting procedure requiring voters to produce 
identification before they can cast their ballot.
106
 The proposed bill 
attempts to not penalize the states based on the Attorney General’s 
potential challenges to certain state voter identification laws. The 
“measure would not allow Department of Justice objections to a voter 
ID law to count as one of the five violations against a state.”
107
   
III. MEETING THE GOALS OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
A. Dealing with Second Generation Barriers 
The dissent in Shelby County correctly argued for the continued 
need for covered jurisdictions under section 4(b) of the VRA. By 
repealing Section 4(b), the Court has shifted the burden back to the 
Department of Justice to prosecute each potential voting violation 
individually under Section 2.
108
 If left unchecked, second generation 
barriers to minority voting, will dilute the power of these votes. The 
laws passed and implemented by previously covered jurisdictions 
mere hours after the decision was made are clear indications of the 
ever-present threat of minority voter suppression. In particular, the 
federal government has already found that the laws in Texas and 
Mississippi have had the effect of limiting voting rights of minority 
voters.
109
  
Laws imposing stricter requirements on voters produce 
unnecessary hardship and delay for voters, which ultimately 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. A much-needed fix for the Voting Rights Act, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Jan. 24, 2014), 
http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/20140124-editorial-a-much-needed-fix-for-the-
voting-rights-act.ece. 
 108. See supra note 18.  
 109. Horowitz, supra note 85; Emily Le Coz, Mississippi Voter ID Law Put On Hold For 
Election Following Federal Review, REUTERS (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2012/10/03/mississippi-voter-id-law_n_1934121.html.  
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decreases voter turnout and participation. In Texas’s law, for 
example, though no voter will be turned away from the polls if the 
identification provided does not match the voter database, she will 
either need to sign an affidavit at the polling location attesting to her 
identity or cast a provisional ballot.
110
 In Dallas, Texas alone, there 
are 195,000 people who potentially faced difficulty at the polls as a 
result of having names that were not updated in the voter registration 
database for the 2014 elections.
111
 Therefore, on election day, each of 
these voters faced increased wait times in already long lines to vote, 
or they were forced to cast provisional ballots and asked to return to 
the polling place within six days to verify their identity.
112
 If they did 
not return, their votes were not be counted.
113
 These procedures only 
reduce voter access to the ballot box and create more problems than 
they solve.
114
 
B. The Proposed Amendment 
The proposed “Voting Rights Act Amendment of 2014” provides 
a meaningful framework to develop a new coverage formula that will 
revive protections for potentially vulnerable populations of voters.  
The proposed amendment attempts to find the proper balance 
between covered and uncovered jurisdictions, and the new formula 
provides boundaries to deduce which areas had substantial evidence 
of voting discrimination by using evidence of impropriety obtained 
by the Department of Justice. This perspective was specifically 
 
 110. Manny Fernandez, Party Predictions Differ in Texas on Impact of Voter ID Law, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/06/us/party-predictions-differ-in-texas-
on-impact-of-new-voter-id-law.html?_r=0. 
 111. Tom Benning, Fallout from voter ID law continues in Dallas County, DALL. 
MORNING NEWS (Feb. 1, 2014), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/metro/20140201-fallout-
from-voter-id-law-continues-at-dallas-county.ece. 
 112. Fernandez, supra note 110. 
 113. Manny Fernandez, Texas ID Law Keeps Hundreds of Ballots From Being Counted, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2014/11/18/texas-id-
law-keeps-hundreds-of-ballots-from-being-counted/. 
 114. “While not perfect, the old system in Texas was built upon the proper premise that 
voter laws should encourage voter turnout—not discourage entire segments of would-be voters. 
Until the passage of the new voter photo ID law, Texans could show, among other documents, a 
utility bill as proof of identity allowing them to cast a ballot.” DALL. MORNING NEWS, supra 
note 93.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/13
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015]  Renewing the Promise of the Voting Rights Act 171 
 
 
advocated for by the Supreme Court in Katzenbach.
115
 The proposed 
law would only place specific jurisdictions that committed five or 
more voting violations in the last fifteen years under the purview of 
the preclearance requirement. The remedy can be properly applied 
because the wrongs committed are clearly outlined in the sections of 
the proposed provision that define “violations” and “low voter 
turnout.”
116
  
If the new formula were to be legally challenged, it would also 
meet the requirements for constitutionality outlined in City of Rome 
and Lopez.
117
 First, with the new formulation, the preclearance 
requirement would be imposed in response to the perceived harm of 
voting violations. Second, it would only subject states with five or 
more voting rights violations to the preclearance requirements. 
Finally, it would provide a “bailout” provision to assist states in 
limiting the control that the Department of Justice has over their 
affairs. 
In accordance with the Court’s recommendations in Shelby 
County, the proposed Amendment to the Act would impose burdens 
that are justified by the current needs. Current statistics were used to 
determine which jurisdictions would be added or removed from 
preclearance coverage.
118
 With the new formula, only Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas would be placed back on the 
preclearance requirement. This points to the strength of the 
specifically tailored provision. The decreased number of covered 
jurisdictions reflects the improving conditions for minority voting 
and voters in the South described by Chief Justice Roberts and the 
majority in Shelby County.  
However, the proposed amendment still does not resolve the heart 
of the problem. Even with these measures, the Department of Justice 
will have to continue to devote numerous man-hours and will have to 
expend taxpayer money to effectively prosecute each new violation 
 
 115. See supra note 44. 
 116. According to the Court in Shelby County, Section 4(b) is unconstitutional because the 
ends no longer justify the means. The formula is no longer narrowly tailored enough to justify 
disparate treatment of states. However, the formulations proposed in the amendment have a 
higher chance of meeting this requirement because of their specificity in application. 
 117. See supra notes 48, 54.  
 118. See supra note 65. 
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by formerly covered jurisdictions. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in 
Shelby County recounts the history of suppression of minority voters. 
Each time the Department of Justice combats a new form of voting 
restriction, states find different forms to replace it. This was the 
essential function of the VRA: it provided the Department of Justice 
with an efficient means to provide protection for minority voters.  
Another problematic feature of the proposed amendment is the 
number of violations a state or political subdivision must commit in 
order to become subject to the preclearance requirement. A reduction 
to the number of violations required from five violations to three 
violations for states would be more in line with the legislative intent 
of the VRA, because three violations is enough to show a consistent 
pattern of disenfranchisement of voters. Three violations should be 
enough to prove the jurisdiction’s intent to suppress the power of the 
minority vote. 
The proposed amendment also fails to address the second-
generation barriers that threaten minority voting rights. The provision 
defining “voting rights violations” must include the voter 
identification bills introduced in multiple states. More subtle 
restrictions, such as reductions in the number of polling places, 
restrictions on absentee ballots, and proof of citizenship 
requirements, must also be addressed in order to fully protect the 
“electoral access among the socially marginalized.”
119
  
Finally, the proposed formula does not cover enough jurisdictions 
to provide an effective remedy for voting rights violations. A better 
formula would account for changes that have occurred over the last 
forty years that the VRA has been in place, while still recognizing 
that the previous formula stopped much of the egregious behavior by 
covered states. Resting the new coverage formula on the number of 
violations within the previous fifteen-year period does little to 
acknowledge the success of Section 4(b).  Therefore, Congress needs 
an alternate strategy to resolve the problem left by the Supreme Court 
in Shelby County.    
 
 119. Bentele and O’Brien, supra note 92, at 1103. 
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C. A New Coverage Formula 
Congress must structure the new preclearance formula around the 
number of successful Section 5 objection determinations interposed 
by the Department of Justice over a twenty-year period
120
 plus the 
number of dismissals of voting changes by the District Court of the 
District of Columbia.
121
 To become a covered jurisdiction, the state 
or political subdivision should be required to have three or more of 
the objections and dismissals over the twenty-year period.
122
 Three 
violations demonstrate a pattern to intentional disenfranchise of 
minority voters. The successful objections by the Attorney General 
and the dismissals by the District Court of the District of Columbia 
effectively show that a jurisdiction’s proposed change to their voting 
laws would negatively impact minority voters.    
This formula would better protect voters than the one contained in 
the recently proposed amendment for three key reasons. First, 
jurisdictions must establish that the proposed voting change “does not 
have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging 
the right to vote on account of race or color or [membership in a 
language minority group].”
123
 This formula has the built-in benefit of 
already screening for a discriminatory purpose in voting practices. It 
would effectively subject only those states with the most egregious 
numbers of violations to the preclearance requirement.  
Second, increasing the effective date to twenty years and 
decreasing the number of allowable rejections and dismissals from 
five to four, would include more of the previously covered 
 
 120. The twenty-year period would extend from 1984–2014. This extends the period 
advocated in the proposed bill by five years. The Department of Justice provides data 
describing objections, continuances, and withdrawals on its website. Section 5 Objection 
Letters, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, www.justice.gov/crt/records/vot/obj_letters/index.php  
 121. The judicial determinations by the three-judge panel in the District Court of the 
District of Columbia are also provided on the Justice Department website. Section 5 
Declaratory Judgment Actions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/ 
sec_5/caselist_ddc.pdf. 
 122. Political subdivisions and states should be required to have the same number of 
violations because the impact on the minority voters is the same whether the election takes 
place on the state or local level.  
 123. Judicial Review of Voting Changes in About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/about.php. 
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jurisdictions
124
 and is therefore more in line with Congress’s intent 
when they reauthorized the VRA in 2006 for another twenty-five year 
period. As supported by the study by Ellen Katz,
125
 jurisdictions that 
were subject to the previous preclearance formula committed more 
voting rights violations than those that were not.
126
 A jurisdiction will 
not always be subject to preclearance as there will be an opportunity 
to bailout of the preclearance requirement.   
Third, this formula would ground the coverage formula in 
“current conditions” to meet current needs, as required by the Court 
in Shelby County.
127
 This would shift the burden back to the 
offending states and political subdivisions to prove the law is not 
racially discriminatory, and it would provide protection against 
second-generation barriers in jurisdictions where minority voters 
need it most.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The recent push by previously covered jurisdictions to implement 
restrictive voting laws in the wake of the Shelby County decision 
should press Congress to mend the broken VRA. Restrictive voting 
laws systematically restrict the ability of minority voters to cast their 
ballot. Though the proposed amendment provided by a bipartisan 
group of members of the House of Representatives provides a good 
starting point, it does not go far enough to fix the problem. The 
formula must include a larger number of previously covered 
jurisdictions and better address second-generation barriers to voting. 
While it may be a step in the right direction, stronger measures are 
needed in order to effectuate the overall intent of the VRA—to 
protect socially marginalized voters from disenfranchisement. 
 
 124. Under the new formula proposed, Texas, Virginia, South Carolina, Mississippi, 
Louisiana, Georgia, Arizona, Alabama, and parts of North Carolina and New York would be 
subject to preclearance coverage based on the Justice Department objections alone.  
 125. See Shelby Cnty Ala., 113 S. Ct. at 2642. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 2631. 
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